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Having witnessed decades of political 
imbroglio, Nepal is once again set to go to 
the polls on November 19. After 2008, it 
will be the second time that the electorate 
has to cast their ballots for a Constitutional 
Assembly (CA) - the country’s national 
parliament. However, instead of gleefully 
looking forward to what is meant to be a 
‘feast of democracy’, sentiments of 
concern prevail among Nepalese and 
international observers. On the face of it 
this might seem odd because the call for 
an election is the logical next step now 
that a new constitution has been drafted. 
What is more, this constitution provides for 
higher empowerment of the people and a 
more stringent observance of the rule of 
law, which is a crucial prerequisite for 
national stability.  However, as the polling 
day approaches the political situation in 
the country is turning increasingly murky. 
There are serious concerns among the 
around 12.5 million voters in the 240 
constituencies that the elections will be not 
free and fair at all. In fact there are 
numerous indications that the polls, 
especially the legitimacy of them, will be 
challenged through different determinants. 
 
First of all, the electoral campaigns of the 
major political parties, especially the 
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-
M), Unified Communist Party of Nepal-
Maoist (UCPN-M), CPN-Unified Marxist-
Leninist (UML), the Nepali Congress (NC), 
United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) 
and Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), 
were accompanied with a remarkable 
upsurge of violence. Most noteworthy in 
this context is the attempt to enforce a 
general strike (‘bandh’) of an alliance of 
more than 33 oppositional parties (out of 
124 officially registered ones) under the 
leadership of the CPN-M, which is a 
splinter group of the UCPN-M. The CPN-
M, also known as ‘Mohan Baidya group’ is 
boycotting the CA elections. This casts a 
dark shadow both on the actual electoral 
process but also on the acceptance of the 
electoral results. Besides the latest strike 
to undermine the polls, other violent 
criminal activities were carried out, 
including attacks on buses, explosions 
with improvised explosives, robberies, and 
lootings. This was obviously done to 
create an atmosphere of fear and 
lawlessness in the country and to flank 
additional activities of the anti-elections 
camp of the CPN-M like door-to-door 
campaigns to ‘convince’ the people not to 
vote. It is worth mentioning, however, that 
most of these violent clashed occured 
between supporters of tthe CPN-Maoist 
and the UCPN-M. One has to be also 
aware that the issue of how far a military 
option (war) should remain an acceptable 
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constituent in the political strategic 
portfolio led to the split up of the hard-line 
faction CPN-Maoist from the UCPN-M. 
Until now, the CPN-Maoists refrained from 
direct, armed confrontation with the 
security forces. 
  
Furthermore, there is the problem that a 
substantial part of the Nepalese voters 
(around 3.5 millions) did not get 
registered. In other words, neither the 
ideal scenario of getting all of the 16 
million Nepalese which are eligible to vote 
nor the less ambitious aim of the Election 
Commission of having 14.7 million of the 
people enrolled in the voters list was 
achieved. Here, a major issue was without 
doubt the issue of undocumented 
residents and the problems related with 
the obviously insufficient government-
initiated citizenship campaigns. This marks 
a clear indication for a lack of legitimacy of 
the electoral process. 
 
There are also several reports that some 
political parties and (independent) 
candidates were restricted in their political 
freedom of movement to carry out 
campaigning activities. Due to significant 
security issues the affected parties and 
politicians were faced with hindrances to 
organize large gatherings. In other words, 
they were forcefully limited in their rights 
for political participation, association and 
speech. Here, some of the most reported 
incidents include obstructions of 
campaigning and vandalism of party 
materials, vehicles and offices. There were 
also numerous other violations of the 
‘election code of conduct’, including 
activities to disrupt voter registration, theft 
and destruction of voter education 
materials and the obstruction of civic 
educators. Furthermore, there is an 
increasing numbers of reports about the 
mismanagement of financial funds during 
the electoral contestation of the CA by 
several candidates.   
 
Last but not least – and arguably worst of 
all – there is the most important issue of 
impunity. Numerous candidates of the on-
going CA elections were involved in 
serious human rights violation during the 
civil war, such as extrajudicial killings, 
rape, torture, and enforced 
disappearances, and other criminal 
offences – and most of them have not 
been brought to justice. There is no 
difference between candidates who 
belonged to the state agencies or the 
Maoists, since both sides enjoy absolute 
impunity. However, beside the fact that 
Nepal recognizes most of the international 
judicial standards, the country’s authorities 
did nothing substantial to bring justice to 
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the country. This is gaining significance, 
since the country has signed most 
international agreements regarding human 
rights and the current interim constitution 
of the country is stressing the 
government’s commitment towards the 
implementation of its human rights 
obligations. Instead, recommendations by 
the National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) were ignored. Furthermore, a law 
limiting the function and independence of 
the NHRC’s mandate was enforced. Even 
court verdicts are not implemented by the 
state authorities. For example, several 
hundred cases (many of them murders) 
were withdrawn in March 2012 on the 
basis of being political in nature. The 
situation is getting even more complicated 
due to the lack of protection and security 
of human rights defenders. Regarding 
several human rights organization like the 
Nepal-Dialogue Forum for Peace and 
Human Rights, defenders of human rights, 
attempting to document cases of human 
rights abuses and offer legal advice to the 
victims, are exposed to all kinds of 
physical and non-physical threats, 
intimidation and discrimination. As long as 
there is no coherent investigation and 
strict prosecution of all human rights 
abuses as well as infringements of 
international humanitarian law and general 
disrespect for the rule of law, elections will 
suffer from a crucial lack of legitimacy.  
 
Without any doubts, all these issues have 
the strong potential to jeopardize the 
election process. However, the situation 
becomes even murkier if one looks at the 
way in which the Nepalese authorities are 
planning to ensure the protection of the 
elections as enshrined in the Integrated 
Security Plan – 2070 unveiled by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs including a three-
tier security structure composed on 54,000 
Nepalese Police personnel, supported by 
44000 temporary recruits at the core, with 
back-up by 22000 APF personnel in the 
second layer, and finally the outer layer 
consisting of 61,995 NA personnel. This 
strategy means not only that two-thirds of 
the country’s soldiers are involved in the 
election process but also the first time of 
the deployment of the army in electoral 
security since the end of the civil war. This 
is gaining significance because of the 
following reasons: First, the country is 
characterized by the absence of 
institutionalized civilian control. Second, 
the fact that the security personal enjoys 
absolute impunity for human rights 
violation and other abuses will not help to 
reduce the level of fear among the 
electorate. Third, the still unfinished, 
insufficient process of reconciliation and 
the tensions between the former 
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combatants which merged within the 
security sector will most likely lead to a 
continuation of conflicts within the existing 
agencies of the state and will enforce 
factionalism. Fourth, there is a 
phenomenon that politicians and political 
parties have the habit to influence the 
process of military organization (especially 
appointments, transfers, and promotions) 
will lead to a high level of political 
awareness among the country’s armed 
forces. Subsequently, there is the 
imminent threat that the country’s armed 
forces are developing more interests in 
respective political affiliation than in 
military professionalism.  
Fifth, the fact that the soldiers until now did 
not show much interest in formal and 
direct interventions does not mean that 
they will not develop such desires in the 
future especially in the context of the 
deteriorating socio-economic and political 
conditions. Additionally, one has to be 
aware that civil-military relations are not 
only determined by the presence or 
absence of coups d’états, but rather by a 
continuum of different forms of inventions 
including informal, ‘behind-the-scenes 
influence’ on political decision-making. The 
latter is particularly important because the 
Nepalese army is most likely to choose 
such an approach should it be interested 
in influencing politics. In other words, if the 
soldiers want to intervene in politics, this 
will most likely happen in a more 
concealed manner in order not to get 
sanctioned by the international community. 
On top of this, one has to be also aware 
that it still remains unclear how far the 
Nepalese Army was able to perform the 
shift from serving under a monarchial or a 
democratic form of governance. In other 
words, democratic principles are not yet 
fully embedded in the collective mindset of 
the security forces. This is gathering 
greater momentum, since civilian 
institutions are mostly weak and 
insufficient especially not to carry out 
effectively civilian control. In sum, these 
issues are marking serious concerns on 
the eve of the elections for the second CA. 
The deployment of security forces without 
a clear modus operandi, no transparent 
chain of command, and unsolved internal 
issues must be identified as a critical act of 
negligence for the country’s democratic 
transition.  
 
Nevertheless, apart from these 
tremendous challenges, the authorities 
and the general people are dedicated to 
safeguard at least the technical dimension 
of the elections and will not allow that the 
process gets interrupted by anti-systemic 
forces. But even if there are more or less 
smooth and accepted national polls 
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leading to the establishment of a newly 
elected CA, the core issues for the 
ongoing turmoil will continue to dominate 
all contemporary and future political 
processes. More concrete, the new CA will 
have to take on a heavy burden of deeply 
entrenched unfortunate political legacies. 
These legacies led not-only to stagnation 
in political decision-making in most of the 
significant areas and tiers of governance 
but also to a crucial hindrance towards the 
build-up as well as consolidation of 
effective democratic institutions. It is 
noteworthy, that the latest CA which was 
set up in the aftermath of 10-years Maoist 
uprising (1996-2006) and the abolition of 
the monarchy in 2008, was dissolved in 
March 2012, after failing to draft a post 
war constitution.   
Instead of building the common ground for 
an effective institutional structure to 
strengthen the process of peace and 
national reconciliation, there was a slow 
but persistent weakening of the existing 
political-administrative framework. 
Furthermore, the last years were featured 
by a deterioration of the quality of political 
leadership. A phenomenon which was 
confirmed by a survey, ‘Insights South Asia 
– Nepal Survey 2011’, conducted by the 
South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF) and 
Gallup Europe found that the lack of 
political leadership is one of the most 
significant factors that hamper, for 
example, economic growth in Nepal. 
Therefore, it will be of crucial importance 
that the new CA will take on the task of 
ending the constitutional stalemate and 
find a broadly accepted solution for power 
sharing. Some of the most important 
issues are the introduction of a federal 
system, the debate over an executive 
presidency as form of governance, or a 
potential sharing of power between prime 
minister and president among others. Until 
now, the constitutional and the consequent 
legislative vacuum functioned as a 
catalyzer for the erosion of the rule of law 
in the county and the denial of justice in 
the country creating a tremendous level of 
humanitarian costs among the Nepalese 
populations. However, at the moment it 
looks rather grim when it comes to 
identifying trends which could indicate an 
improvement of the work of the second 
CA. Having the country’s troubled political 
history and the latest pre-election scuffles 
in mind, it appears legitimate to raise the 
question about the political will and the 
capacities of the new CA to deliver the 
most needed reforms. In contrast, due to 
fact that impunity remains practically 
unchallenged and mechanism of 
transitional justice are not established, and 
subsequently persecutors of human rights 
violation stand up in elections does not 
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bode well for the potential output of the 
second CA. Also regarding the 
improvement of the situation of other 
marginalized groups, especially women’s 
rights, one cannot expect much from the 
CA. Only 10 percent of the registered 
candidates are women.  It rather gives the 
impression that they might not be 
interested in changing the status quo 
when it comes to impunity, justice, human 
rights, and gender equality. 
 
There are no doubts that holding polls is 
the only way out of the long-drawn 
imbroglio hampering any political and 
socio-economic progress in the country. 
But it must be ensured that the elections 
and the subsequent set-up of the second 
CA own sufficient legitimacy. This is only 
possible when the elections are perceived 
as free and fair. Furthermore, there must 
be an end of impunity of perpetrators of 
human rights violations and other criminal 
activities. Just the expression of the 
political will but no consequent 
implementation will lead to further tensions 
and erosion of the existing democratic 
norms, values and institutional structure in 
Nepal. Additionally, a condemnation of the 
culture of violence, accepted mechanism 
of transitional justice as well as a clear 
internalization of the notion of 
accountability, among the state as well as 
the society is much needed.  In sum, 
without accepted election peace and 
stability in Nepal will remain as a distant 
dream. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
